Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Since the end of the third wave of democratisation, comparative research has increasingly focused on the factors that can thwart democratic transition and enhance the resilience of authoritarian regimes (Croissant and Wurster 2013; Kailitz and Köllner 2013; Köllner and Kailitz 2013; Gerschewski 2013; Gerschewski 2010: 47) . More specifically, several recent studies have focused on how regime performance in different policy fields, such as economic development or the provision of social services, may contribute to enhancing or weakening authoritarian durability ; for an example see Croissant and Wurster 2013) . However, the question of how authoritarian regimes use policy performance in the shows that authoritarian regimes frequently enact women-friendly policies and establish institutions that are officially tasked with enhancing the situation of women, while at the same time using women's rights "for purposes other than those of gender equality" (Tripp 2013: 530), such as maintaining the power of the regime. So far, however, this finding has not been linked to the broader research on authoritarian resilience.
Our cross-regional comparison of the use of gender politics in the authoritarian regimes of Algeria in the Middle East and Mozambique in Southern Africa addresses this research gap. We ask what strategies the authoritarian regimes of Algeria and Mozambique employ in the areas of women's rights and gender and how these might contribute to regime resilience.
In attempting to answer this question, we focus on the interactions between each of these authoritarian regimes on the one hand and civil society organisations (CSOs) working on gender and women's rights on the other. We take this approach for both theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical level, various recent studies have argued that in non-democratic settings civil society groups may help make authoritarian regimes more resilient, thereby contradicting earlier theoretical assumptions that civil society leads to democracy (e.g. Froissart 2014; Lewis 2013; Wischermann 2013; Cavatorta 2012; Lorch 2008; Ottaway 2004) . On the practical level, studying CSOs, 1 which are relatively organised entities and whose representatives are fairly accessible, provides us with the possibility of tackling our research subject in contexts where reliable statistical data about political attitudes and women's interaction with the state bureaucracy are hard to come by.
Algeria and Mozambique constitute most dissimilar cases with respect to their colonial legacies and economic conditions, as well as their majority religions and ethnic composition. relied on a very similar mix of strategies in the field of gender politics in order to reinforce their stronghold within society in general and within civil society in particular.
We begin our analysis with a theoretically informed discussion that connects recent debates on the resilience of authoritarian regimes to the research on state feminism. Subsequently, we engage in an empirically grounded, cross-regional comparison of the use of gender politics in Algeria and Mozambique in order to link and enrich both sets of theory on the basis of empirical findings. Our empirical findings are mainly based on interviews conducted with CSOs and experts working in the field of women's rights in Algeria and Mozambique in 2014 and 2015.
Authoritarian Resilience and State Feminism: Theoretical Insights
With the focus of comparative research on democracy and authoritarianism shifting towards authoritarian resilience, many authors have started to ask what stabilises non-democratic regimes. Repression plays an important role. Excessive repression, however, can also destabilise authoritarian rule, as it may lead to counter-reactions such as mass mobilisations or violent uprisings (Gerschewski 2013: 21; Kailitz and Köllner 2013; Gerschewski 2010: 47) . As a consequence, durable authoritarian regimes often rely on a mix of strategies, including not only repression but also legitimation and co-optation (Gerschewski 2013) .
Some recent research has focused on the legitimation strategies that authoritarian rulers employ to maintain power (e.g. Dodlova et. al. 2014; Holbig 2013; Kailitz 2013; Hoffmann 2011) . Another strand of research has dealt with the co-optation mechanisms, such as patronclient networks and arrangements for selective political inclusion, that can be used to make non-democratic rule more resilient (e.g. Erdmann 2013; Josua 2013; Richter 2010; Erdmann and Engel 2005) . In addition, recent research on authoritarian resilience in the Middle East and beyond has stressed the importance of divide-and-rule tactics to the survival of authoritarian regimes (e.g. Thorp 2014; Cavatorta 2012: 6; Hinnebusch 2012; King 2007) .
At least two other strands of recent autocracy research cut across the issues of authoritarian legitimation, co-optation, and divide-and-rule tactics. The first is the research on nominally democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, such as parties, parliaments, and elections (for overviews see Kailitz and Köllner 2013: 17˗19; Schedler 2009 ). Such institutions may be used by authoritarian regimes to enhance their legitimacy and co-opt social groups that are important to their survival, while also having highly exclusionary effects that can be utilised in the context of divide-and-rule strategies. The second is the nascent research on authoritarian performance in different policy fields (Croissant and Wurster 2013: 3) . Policy performance can be used by authoritarian regimes to increase their output legitimation (Croissant and Wurster 2013; see also Dodlova et al. 2014) . At the same time, performance gains in areas such as economic growth may also be used by authoritarian rulers to co-opt -and exclude -particular groups through the allocation of selective benefits. As noted above, there is a need to include gender issues more explicitly into autocracy research. So far, however, the question of how authoritarian regimes use women's rights and gender politics has not been linked to the legitimation, co-optation, or divide-and-rule strategies that authoritarian regimes pursue. Nor has it been linked to the performance strategies and the building of authoritarian institutions in which such regimes engage.
The discussion on state feminism originated in the 1980s and initially referred almost exclusively to post-modern industrialist democracies in the so-called "West" (see e.g. McBride and Mazur 2011; Lovenduski 2008:169˗173) . State feminism, in this sense, relates mostly to changes in power relations by means of the promotion of feminist goals through public policies and measures taken by the state. In particular, this includes the introduction of political quotas, the establishment of women's policy agencies or "national machineries," 2 and different forms of cooperation between the state and the women rights movement (see e.g. McBride and Mazur 2011; Lovenduski 2008; Adams 2007; Lovenduski 2005; Krook 2005 Africa (e.g. Errazzouki and Al-Khawaja 2013; Salhi 2010; Al-Ali 2002 and 2000) .
This nascent literature on authoritarian state feminism finds that, just like democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes frequently establish state feminist machineries and introduce policies, such as quota systems, which are officially intended to promote gender equality. In reality, however, the main motivation behind such measures is often not the advancement of women's rights per se, but the desire of the respective non-democratic regimes to realise other political objectives, such as maintaining power (Tripp 2013: esp. 530; Adams 2007; Soothill 2007: 71˗102) . In other words, the literature on authoritarian state feminism thus suggests that in non-democratic contexts, "state feminist institutions" (Adams 2007: 177) can form part of a wider ensemble of national authoritarian institutions and that women-friendly policies can be used by authoritarian regimes to boost their performance-related legitimacy.
While these insights are of great relevance to our research, the literature on state feminism focuses mainly on the gender outcomes that different kinds of state institutions and 2 For the purpose of this paper, the terms "women's policy agencies" and "national machineries" (e.g. Adams
2007
) are used interchangeably. policies are able to produce. However, as Tripp (2013: 529˗530) has also argued, more research is needed to tackle the question of why authoritarian regimes adopt gender-friendly policies. In the following discussion, we show that in authoritarian contexts, state feminist policies often form part of three specific patterns of authoritarian survival strategies: legitimation, co-optation, and a specific form of divide and rule.
Pattern 1: Using Women's Rights and Gender Politics as an Authoritarian Legitimation Strategy
Recent research on authoritarian legitimation shows that the legitimation strategies employed by non-democratic regimes often include the use of political ideology, historical narratives, and nationalist discourses as well as the establishment of quasi-democratic institutions and international engagement (Dodlova et. al. 2014; Holbig 2013; Kailitz 2013; Hoffmann 2011) . The research on state feminism suggests that the policies that authoritarian regimes adopt in the area of women's rights and gender politics can form part of each of these specific legitimation strategies. Studies on state feminism in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East show that, in this region, women's rights movements were closely related to national liberation movements. As a consequence, discourses on gender equality often became interlinked with the broader nationalist discourses peddled by post-independence states (e.g.
Salhi 2010
; Al-Ali 2002). As Salhi argues, for many (post-)revolutionary, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, state feminism came to constitute a "historical strategy" to "brighten up the image of the state" (Salhi 2010: 49) . Despite considerable geographical and social differences between the two regions, the literature on state feminism in Southern Africa comes to similar conclusions, arguing that here as well the participation of women in national liberation movements has often influenced national discourses and policies on women's rights and gender (see e.g. Casimiro 2014: 186˗189; Mama 2013: 150˗152) . At the same time, the literature on socialist state feminism shows that authoritarian socialist regimes around the world have often presented the realisation of women's rights as an integral part of their political ideology.
Gender equality, in this sense, has often been promoted by such regimes but at the same time "subsumed" under the wider legitimating ideology of socialism (Tripp 2013: 523-524 Furthermore, the literature on state feminism shows that strategies linked to gender and the promotion of women's rights often change during processes of democratization (OkekeIhejirika and Franceschet 2002), a finding that is bound to be relevant for liberalization processes in authoritarian regimes as well. Specifically, the opening up of authoritarian regimes to greater political competition frequently gives rise to the "emergence of autonomous women's movements" (Tripp 2013: 523) . At the same time, many liberalised authoritarian regimes seek to legitimate themselves by publicly portraying the partial realisation of women's rights as an important step towards democratisation (Mama 2013: 150˗153; Tripp 2013: 529˗530; Salhi 2010; Soothill 2007: 78) . Often, this strategy may form part of broader attempts by the respec- and to show to the world that democratization is being seriously launched" (Salhi 2010: 51) . 3 Similarly, Mama argues that authoritarian regimes in Southern Africa have often established state feminist machineries in line with UN rhetoric in order to gain international legitimacy at times when their revolutionary credentials were fading (Mama 2013: 152˗153) .
Pattern 2: Women's Organisations as Mechanisms of Co-optation
The research on authoritarian regimes shows that nominally democratic institutions in such regimes can contribute to enhancing authoritarian resilience, because they can be used as mechanisms of co-optation. As Svolik (2012: 162˗166) (Ghodsee 2014; Tripp 2013: 523˗527; Soothill 2007: 88˗89; Zheng 2005) .
Similarly, in post-independence Southern Africa, women's activism has also often been channelled through women's mass organisations, which have supported national ruling parties through the mobilisation of popular support (Mama 2013; Casimiro 2014 Research on state feminism suggests that divide-and-rule strategies in the areas of gender and women's rights are prominent in many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, where debates on gender equality often constitute "a battleground between secularist and Islamist visions of national identity" (Tripp 2013: 530 , which trains journalists and runs its own radio channel, claimed that many womenfriendly policies, such as the introduction of the quota, had been pushed through by the president in the face of strong political resistance and that it was Bouteflika's "political line"
not to tolerate any discrimination against women. 11
Many of the interviewed CSOs active in the field of gender and women's rights described the introduction of the quota as a success. Moreover, various women's CSOs -including rather independent ones -have implemented various support measures to make the quota work.
For instance, both FeC and the Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur les Droits de l'Enfant et de la Femme (CIDEF, Centre of Information and Documentation for the Rights of
Children and Women) have offered capacity-building programmes for women parliamentarians who entered parliament following the introduction of the quota and still lack political experience. 12 However, some critical women's rights activists lamented that many of the women delegates who entered parliament for parties loyal to the regime were "alibi women" 13 who defended their respective parties' political lines rather than using their positions in order to advocate for women's rights. 14 The regime's efforts to use the partial realisation of women's rights as a legitimation strategy have been directed not only towards Algeria's civil society -and Algerian society as a whole -but also towards the international community. This is exemplified by, among other things, the fact that the regime actively encourages women's organisations to celebrate inter- 
Pattern 2: Women's Organisations as Mechanisms of Co-optation
Since the early post-independence period, the Algerian regime has repeatedly used women's organisations as mechanisms of co-optation. One important part of this strategy has been to use loyal women's organisations to mobilise popular support for the regime. During the socialist period, when independent civil society groups were banned, the ruling FLN mobilised society through sectoral mass organisations such as peasants, workers, women's, or youth groups (e.g. Roca 2012: 72 The oil-rich rentier state of Algeria also co-opts civil society groups through the allocation of material benefits, such as annual subventions (e.g. Liverani 2008 ). Women's CSOs are no exception to this rule, and several of the groups interviewed for this paper received some kind of material support from the state.
As part of its attempts to use women's organisations as mechanisms of co-optation, the regime has also allowed various women's CSOs -including rather independent ones -to participate in consultation processes on public laws and policies relating to women's rights. other fields, such as security or the economy. 40 At the same time, however, the regime also has undertaken various measures to advance the political representation of women, such as the introduction of the quota or the nomination of women to high-ranking political positions, thereby creating a dichotomy between women's advancement in the public sphere and their legal discrimination in the private sphere. This "grand duality" 41 between public and private life has divided the women's rights movement and thereby weakened its influence as a social and political oppositional force.
Most notably, the question of how to deal with the Family Code has caused serious friction within the secular women's rights movement (see also and its fight for independence from colonial rule in the 1960s and 1970s (independence was achieved in 1975) also opened up space for women's political activism in the name of "liberation, equality and emancipation" (Tvedten et al. 2008: 31˗32) . Apart from organising support for male combatants in the so-called "liberated zones," women also demanded the right to actively take part in the freedom fight (Casimiro 2004: 228 (Casimiro 2004: 198-211) . 49 International cooperation has played a major role in supporting women's CSOs and state efforts to introduce more female-friendly policies and structures (ibid.). 50 Since the 1990s, a number of state institutions have introduced gender mainstreaming and specific state machineries for women have been established (Tvedten et al. 2008: 36˗41) . According to the OECD gender index (2014) Mozambique does comparatively well in terms of formal legislation concerning the rights of women and children. However, discriminatory social norms, violence, sexual harassment, and the violation of women's land rights continue to be widespread problems. Regime representatives often tolerate customary systems that enable male relatives to deprive women of access to land despite the law, which formally grants men and women equal land-usage rights. CSOs concerned about gender issues try to gain influence in political decision-making processes by conducting studies, by submitting written recommendations on ongoing law-making projects relating to women's rights, by engaging in formal and informal lobbying, and through public demonstrations, such as marches. 51 However, The authoritarian post-socialist regime in Mozambique uses various strategies and policies to enhance its rule, in the field of gender politics as well. In this context, there is a consciousness on the part of women's rights experts that "gender questions are questions of power." 53
While the regime conveys the image of defending women's rights, empirical evidence shows that it also uses state feminism to pursue objectives linked to its maintenance of power.
Pattern 1: Using Women's Rights and Gender Politics as an Authoritarian Legitimation Strategy
The post-socialist authoritarian regime in Mozambique draws on historical and other public discourses relating to women's rights and gender as one instrument with which to legitimate its rule. According to CSO representatives and scholars, Frelimo uses a women-friendly discourse in order to portray itself to the public as the vanguard of women's emancipation. In its official discourse, for example, the party emphasises institutional measures used to enhance and CSO discourses today. 55 However, it is not just the regime that refers to women's contributions during the war for liberation in its public discourse -for instance, on national women's day -all of the CSOs active in the field of women's rights which we interviewed do so as well.
As one representative of the OMM, formerly the regime's mass women's organisation, put it,
The fight for national independence was the big historic moment in which women fulfilled their role; this inspired and inspires the women of today, because at that time there were men who did not believe that women were as capable as men of participat- ciples of gender equality and of women in leadership positions. However, many CSO respondents noted differences between the state's and their organisation's ideas about the role of women. As a general rule, mass organisations and professional organisations close to the regime tended to see fewer differences between their own ideas and those of the state than more independent ones. Especially the more independent CSOs argued that gender policies should not be limited to a game with numbers, referring to the quota established by Frelimo, but rather focus on the quality of women's rights.
In line with the above, many CSO representatives pointed to contradictions between the regime's discourse and the implementation of women's rights in practice. According to a leading expert and women's rights activist, the regime's image of itself as a defender of women's rights -which it conveys to the public -on the one hand and the practice of law formulation and implementation on the other are not congruent. For instance, she said that "during election campaigns 'hot issues' like women's rights were not thematised in order not to lose male votes." 60 Particularly NGOs and business organisations active in the field of women's rights demand more of a focus on the quality of women's situation on the ground.
The representatives of such organisations view the situation of women in rural areas as particularly precarious. 61 The more independent women's movement has been able to achieve In addition, the regime has also portrayed women's rights as an embodiment of state-led modernisation and democratisation in order to stabilise its rule during different historical phases. During socialist one-party rule, the Mozambican regime strived to achieve a major economic, social, and cultural restructuring and modernisation of the country and society in line with its socialist ideology of creating a "new man." The idea of the revolution included a "rupture with traditions and a fight against obscurantism," 64 according to a UEM expert -for instance, by taking action against initiation rituals and traditional healers as well as traditional authorities. In the context of socialist modernisation, women were, among other things, perceived and supported as an additional workforce contributing to economic production. However, while women increasingly entered the formal labour market, they also had to continue to fulfil their traditional roles and duties in the household (Casimiro 2004: 190) .
After the political and economic liberalisation officially embraced in the constitution of 1994, the ruling Frelimo formally adopted a quota system for women (30 per cent), youth Notably, however, the quotas do not apply to candidates for executive boards of government (Abreu 2004: 63) , limiting the general access of women to high-ranking political posts. The regime uses the relatively high percentage of women in parliament to present the picture of a modern state in terms of gender equality, both internally and externally. 65
The regime also instrumentalises women's rights and gender politics to gain international legitimacy. Since the socialist regime, but especially since international donors active in Mozambique began to promote the political participation of women in the 1990s, the Mozambican state has offered gender trainings for politicians and has sent female political representatives, such as parliamentarians and OMM members, to participate in several international conferences and international organisations, including UN bodies. 66 As an expert The regime also maintains explicit and implicit linkages with other, formally more independent women's CSOs. For instance, high-ranking individual ruling-party members form their own CSOs that also address gender issues. These organisations profit from donor funding and state contacts. In turn, such CSOs often carry out particular tasks for the state -for instance, in the area of HIV/AIDS prevention -which are well received by the population and, as a consequence, also benefit the ruling party. As an expert from UEM explained, the "government creates its own CSOs, which repeat the discourse of government." 75 In order to be able to carry out their activities, several CSOs, including women's CSOs, choose to maintain a sympathetic relationship with the regime. They opt for cooperation rather than confrontation, and are thus often co-opted by the regime. 76 An expert and OMM member explicitly termed this a "strategy of survival" for women's CSOs and for CSOs working in other fields. 77 The regime also uses the inclusion of CSOs defending women's rights in law-and policymaking processes as part of its co-optation strategy. CSOs are often officially invited by state institutions to provide input into law and policy decision-making processes concerning women's and gender issues -for instance, those processes related to the above-mentioned family law, the law against domestic violence, and the penal code. However, CSOs do not always receive the necessary documents and invitations in time. Moreover, at the respective consultation meetings, CSO representatives are often not allowed to speak; rather, they are simply informed about the particular law-and policymaking processes. In order to regain the support of the traditional leaders, the regime has since the 1990s There is one important issue that has been broached already in the paragraphs above but not been analysed explicitly so far: the duality of women's status when it comes to their political promotion in public versus their discrimination in the private sphere, which is tacitly upheld by the Mozambican regime. This discrepancy is considered a "taboo topic" by most One expert summed up this duality as follows: "Machismo and patriarchy continue in the heads of political leaders and women." 106 This mindset influences the use of gender politics on the part of the Mozambican regime.
Conclusion
Algeria and Mozambique differ markedly in terms of their colonial legacies and economic conditions, as well as their majority religions and ethnic compositions. However, both countries are ruled by post-revolutionary, post-socialist authoritarian regimes that adopted some democratic features in the 1980s and 1990s and have since been rather successful in maintaining power. Our comparative empirical findings show that in spite of the economic, religious, and ethnic differences of the societies they govern, both the Algerian regime and the Interestingly, however, very similar tendencies can also be observed in the case of Mozambique, where political Islam and/or orthodox Islamic tendencies have so far not played a prominent role. The socialist one-party regime as well as, later, the liberalised authoritarian regime in Mozambique have both instrumentalised social and political divisions in order to maintain power. This also is also true for gender politics. Immediately after independence, the socialist Frelimo regime used the promotion of women's rights as part of its attempt to form a "new man," a strategy that was also directed at weakening the power of traditional social authorities. In recent years, however, the regime has mostly pursued a strategy of political accommodation vis-à-vis the traditional authorities so as to gain their support in opposing the political opposition, including Renamo. In this context and despite its official discourse of promoting women's rights, the regime has also adopted a policy of tolerance towards many so-called "cultural" customs that are highly patriarchal in character.
As far as the issue of women's rights is concerned, this strategy of accommodation has been On a broader theoretical level, the comparative findings presented in this paper suggest that valuable insights into the relationship between women's rights and authoritarian politics could be gained through the better integration of the research on state feminism and the theoretical literature on authoritarian resilience. More specifically, future research based on such a joint approach should explore whether the three theoretical patterns according to which authoritarian regimes can use gender politics for the purpose of maintaining power, which have been identified in this paper, can be found in authoritarian regimes outside the Middle East and Southern Africa as well. Similarly, future comparative research could also provide insights into whether these three patterns, which this study has applied to post-revolutionary and post-socialist regimes, also characterise authoritarian politics in countries that are ruled by other types of authoritarian regimes such as monarchies or military dictatorships.
Last but not least, our evidence from Algeria, a majority-Muslim country, and from
Mozambique -a country of mixed religious affiliations, including Christian, Islamic, and indigenous animist beliefs -also suggests that political power structures and patriarchal traditions styled as "cultural heritage" are much more important in determining gender outcomes than religious factors. Future comparative research on gender politics in authoritarian polities that differ with regard to their majority religion and religious composition may provide further valuable insights into this issue.
